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ABSTRACT
With one of the lowest fertility rates on record, Taiwan is at the forefront of the global lowestlow fertility phenomenon. Policymakers in Taiwan and researchers around the world have a
considerable interest in the reasons driving Taiwan’s depressed fertility and possible ways to
alleviate the associated economic concerns. Properties of the housing market represent one
suggested factor that may be contributing to this trend. Using individual panel data from
Taiwan’s Panel Study of Family Dynamics, I test the correlation between homeownership and
fertility outcomes. I find that other variables, such as marriage, age, generation, and
socioeconomic status, can explain much of the homeownership effect and appear more
significant for family planning.
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INTRODUCTION
Low and declining fertility rates in highly developed countries have been the subject of
interest and concern throughout the past three decades. This demographic issue has resulted in
new economic and social problems for the affected countries, and if the trend continues,
threatens to greatly exacerbate those problems in the decades to come. Although low fertility
rates are a question facing many parts of the globe, they have been a particularly prevalent issue
for East Asia in recent years. Taiwan is leading the downward charge, consistently posting
fertility rates that put it among the world’s two lowest for several years now. As reversing this
trend has become a growing priority for policymakers in Taiwan, a wide range of approaches are
being investigated in hopes of increasing fertility or staving off the long-term consequences of
gentrification. One area of interest for demographic policy has been in the housing market, which
the government of Taiwan, the United Nations, and academics have discussed as a factor in
Taiwan’s low fertility rate. With one of the highest homeownership rates in the world,
investigating the role housing in Taiwan plays in family planning is a valuable way to study the
causes and potential responses to fertility decline in the unique Taiwanese context.
Demographic transition, the socioeconomic phenomenon of explosive fertility trends
transforming into low-fertility environments, has given rise to record-breaking fertility rate lows
since the 1990s. The potential difficulties that could be created by severely diminished fertility,
economic and otherwise, has prompted a great deal of research interest for academics (Azevedo,
Módenes, & López-Colás, 2019; Kohler, H. P., Billari, F. C., & Ortega, J. A., 2002; Mulder, &
Billari, F. C., 2010) and policymakers alike. (European Commission, 2005; National
Development Council, 2015; United Nations, 2015) While fertility rates can be categorized as
low when they fall beneath replacement-level fertility (RLF), defined as 2.1 children per woman
(Lee & Lin, 2016), the extreme case of lowest-of-low fertility sparks significant interest and
often becomes a political issue for the affected country. Lowest-of-low fertility, typically defined
as a total fertility rate (TFR) below 1.3 children per woman, has become a growing issue in
developed, post-industrial nations primarily in East Asia, Southern, and Eastern Europe. Taiwan
has been categorized as a lowest-low fertility country for more than a decade.
Using panel data for Taiwan, I investigate how individuals’ fertility choices correlate to
their homeownership status, an open question among researchers. Prior research has uncovered
conflicting results when analyzing the relationship between homeownership characteristics and
fertility trends, especially in low-fertility parts of the world. Investigating the effect of
homeownership on fertility can provide policy-relevant insight for nations looking to shape their
demographic outlook in the coming century. Several East Asian nations today face economic
hardship associated with soaring real estate prices and housing scarcity. For Taiwan in particular,
socioeconomic factors like the housing market and wage stagnation have been theorized to
contribute to its record-low fertility rates. A better understanding of homeownership’s influence
on family planning choices can improve our academic comprehension of the factors that support
childbearing and sharpen the effectiveness of pro-natal policy.

BACKGROUND
The Lowest-Low Fertility Story: A Global View
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is defined by demographers as the expected number of
live births per woman over the course of her lifetime. This measure is developed for a given year
by first tabulating the fertility rates at each age within the population of interest (i.e. the
probability that a woman of a certain age will have a child). These single-age fertility rates are
then all summed to determine the TFR in a given year. The resulting statistic measures the
number of children a woman would be expected to have on average if she lived through her
entire reproductive lifecycle and faced the current year’s age-specific birth rates at each age. This
is distinct from the birth rate metric, which demographers define as the annualized number of
live births per 1000 women within a certain population. Birth rates are a component in
calculating TFR, but TRF is often considered a superior metric for analytical studies because it
measures an entire reproductive lifecycle while remaining fixed at once point in time and it
provides for intuitive applications.
The term lowest-low fertility was first defined in the modern academic lexicon by
Kohler, Billari, and Ortega in their work dealing with falling fertility rates across Europe in the
early 2000s. (Kohler, Billari, & Ortega, 2001; KBO, 2002) Their 2002 paper ascribes the term
lowest-low fertility to fertility regimes where the TFR is below 1.3 live births per woman.
Interest in record-low fertility rates arose when Italy and Spain crossed the 1.3 TFR threshold in
the 1990s. By 2001, fourteen European nations had been identified as having lowest-low fertility
rates. (KBO, 2001) The European Union had recognized falling fertility as a major demographic
issue by 2005, with the population of Europe as a whole set to decline absent immigration.
(European Commission, 2005) A chief concern outlined by the European Commission’s 2005
green paper was a shrinking labor force, leaving fewer workers to support more retirees. Further,
the paper noted that “never in history has there been economic growth without population
growth.” This demographic problem had already arrived for several European nations and was
clearly on the horizon for most others, threatening economic consequences for the entire
continent.
The concept of lowest-low fertility was limited to a European phenomenon in the 1990s.
However, the early 2000s saw the same trend spreading across East Asian countries as well:
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and the administrative regions of Hong Kong and
Macao had all joined the lowest-low fertility club by 2002. (Billari, 2008) These nations
followed a very different trend from the phenomenon of fertility decline in Europe. While most
lowest-low fertility European nations saw a shallow descent from TFRs of around 2 in the 1950s
to around 1 in the 1990s, the East Asian nations that today make up the handful of lowestfertility nations in the world had very high fertility rates in the 1950s, with some TFRs nearing
seven children per women. Figure 1 shows the history of total fertility rates in a selection of
nations categorized as lowest-of-low. Taiwan, which jostles back and forth with South Korea for
the distinction of having the lowest fertility rate in the world, started the period since 1950 with
one of the highest TFRs in the world and the peak among nations recorded in the figure.

Figure 1: Global Lowest-Low Fertility Rates
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Over the course of the past decade, research into low fertility has focused on several
potential contributors to the trend. When Europe first took on low fertility as an economic
concern, the European Commission identified difficulty in achieving the economic conditions
necessary for family formation as the major cause of fertility decline. (EC, 2005) Among the
economic factors the green paper lists as contributing to this trend are labor force difficulties for
young people (slower entry, rate of promotion, etc.), housing inaccessibility, and little economic
incentivization to reproduce. These factors that interested policymakers were similar to the
factors being considered in academic studies of Europe’s fertility rate crisis at the time.
In their research that coined the lowest-low fertility classification, Kohler, Billari, and
Ortega (2001) took a survey of macroeconomic indicators they hypothesized to affect fertility for
a number of countries. They found these economic barometers varied greatly among lowest-low
fertility nations—namely GDP per capita and inflation. Noting the variety of economic
experiences faced by the nations in question, from high unemployment in Mediterranean nations
to post-Soviet states’ market transition, they instead developed the hypothesis that economic
uncertainty produces an incentive to delay reproduction. For example, higher youth
unemployment rates reduce the opportunity cost of higher education for young people and may
exacerbate the labor market payoff for getting a degree. Following this logic, the student
population grows and the average age of a first-time parent is delayed. Other potential culprits
include delayed and reduced marriage trends. (Lee, 2009) Institutional problems in the housing
market have been a common suspect in lowest-low fertility literature. (EC, 2005; KBO, 2002;
Lo, 2012; Mulder & Billari, 2010) Nonetheless, it is difficult to settle on a single clear story for
why lowest-low fertility arises and persists in certain places.

Nations experiencing lowest-of-low fertility rates have pursued a number of responses to
the issue. East Asian countries have taken a particularly aggressive response. In Japan, pro-natal
government initiatives began in the 1990s and have gotten more aggressive since (Abe, Chitose,
Katsumata, & Oishi, 2004) Japan has one of the lowest fertility rates in the entire world and
faces a declining population. (UN, 2019) More than any other nation, Japan has aggressively
pursued pro-natal policies to combat what the Japanese government views as a demographic
crisis. Since 2007 there has even been a ministry position in the government’s cabinet dedicated
to implementing pro-natal measures. (Takao, 2014) South Korea’s Ministry of Gender Equality
serves a similar purpose for demographic issues. South Korea has spent several years of the past
decade with the world’s lowest birth rate, prompting the government to also implement pro-natal
policies. For the South Korean Ministry of Gender Equality, most policies focus on promoting
family-friendly labor conditions, such as financial support for new mothers. (Lee & Zaidi, 2020)
Though the pro-natal policies of Japan and South Korea have yet to produce convincing results,
the level of government interest in these policies has been more pronounced than in lowest-low
fertility parts of the Chinese-speaking world.
The People’s Republic of China has perhaps most famous and heavy-handed case of
demographic policy in the world. Its one-child policy, implemented under Deng Xiaoping in the
1980s, was a way to respond to a projected population that Communist Party officials feared
would be economically unsustainable. Though the one-child policy began in the 1980s, its
advent followed a decade of anti-natal policies rolled out under the Communist Party. Although
the PRC was successful in its aim of shrinking the Mainland TFR from more 5.73 in 1970 to an
equilibrium around 1.6 by the late 1990s, (OECD, 2022) the long run consequences of anti-natal
policies were not as their Deng-era crafters had anticipated. The policy failed to account for its
own success, resulting in a myriad of demographic-based social issues faced by the government
today. Each family having one child radically altered economic participation, the culture around
aging, and the social framework around raising children. (Lou & Si, 2014; Zhang & Goza, 2006)
In China, where there is no social safety net for seniors, children are expected to support their
parents in their old age. The one child policy resulted in the “little emperor” generation, with
parents heaping resources into their single child’s education as well as stressful expectations for
their future. (Wang & Fong, 2009) In light of these problems and their potential to cause
socioeconomic hardship in Chinese society, the PRC revoked its one-child policy in 2015—and
the government quickly upped the bar to a three-child policy just a few years later. However, the
policy change alone has left much to be desired in terms of demographic outcomes for the PRC,
as a rebound in the annual birth rate has yet to materialize.

The Taiwan Story
Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, has one of the world’s lowest fertility rates.
With a population hovering around 24 million, the island off the coast of China’s Mainland
(referred to as a country for the purposes of this paper) presents one of the most interesting cases
in the world today for studying family planning. Taiwan sits at the intersection of traditional
Chinese culture and Confucian family structures, rapidly liberalizing social values, hereditary
wealth, and global capitalism. Today, it faces one of the world’s most pressing demographic
predicaments that looks poised to redefine the island’s intergenerational economy in the twentyfirst century.

For Taiwan, many of the cultural and demographic characteristics that drove the
demographic difficulties for Mainland China under a low fertility regime hold true, even if the
policy has been very different. Around the same time the PRC was formulating its One Child
Policy, which debuted in 1980, Taiwan was facing a similar explosion of new births (averaging a
TFR of 7 births per woman and a 3.6% annual increase in the total population) that spurred
overpopulation concerns and brought about government policy aimed at reducing the birth rate.
(Lee, 2009; Lee & Lin, 2016; United Nations, 2019) The result was two decades of anti-natalist
policy, designed to bring Taiwan’s annual population growth rate down from 3.6% to below 2%.
However, as early as the 1990s, an inverse of the demographic issue became apparent when the
percentage of elderly persons first exceeded 7%, representing a rapidly ageing population. (UN,
2015) Alongside a cohort of similar developed East Asian nations enduring demographic
transition, the ROC’s policy and academic outlook quickly shifted from concern about
overpopulation to concern about declining fertility, and anti-natal policy was swapped out for
pro-natal policy soon after. (Lee & Lin, 2016) As the problem has accelerated and Taiwan faces
one of the world’s only shrinking population forecasts, Taiwanese political interest in these
prenatal policies have grown.
The projected outcomes of Taiwan’s declining fertility represent some of the most
extreme facing any country today, even among lowest-low fertility nations. A dependency ratio
represents the number of dependents (children and elderly dependents) per one hundred workingage people. Due to falling birth rates yielding fewer child dependents, Taiwan’s dependency
ratio has declined in recent history, from 57 in 1980 to 40 in 2020. (National Development
Council, 2020) Looking to the future, however, paints a stark picture. The dependency ratio is
project to skyrocket beyond 100 in the next fifty years, resulting in an unprecedented
demographic structure with more dependents than working-age people. The same model,
provided by Taiwan’s National Development Council, (2020) also projects a falling birth rate
and child dependency ratio through the year 2070, meaning the record-breaking dependency
ratio is due to a ballooning elderly dependent population. The council projects this figure may
more than quadruple per working-age person between 2020 and 2070. While it is true that we
now have several decades of experience across multiple parts of the world with demographic
trends towards low fertility and growing elderly populations, the extremity of this projection for
Taiwan represents a severe gentrification even when compared to present-day demographic
structures.
To further illustrate the macroeconomic considerations a demographic change like this
could bring about, consider the proportion of elderly dependents to workers. The support ratio, or
number of working-age people per elderly dependents, has the potential to fall from 5 workingage persons to just 1.2 in the same time frame, caused by a combination of longer life
expectancy, Taiwan’s largest generation reaching old age, and low fertility leaving a smaller
generation to replace them. (NDC, 2020) The implication is that the necessary contribution from
a worker to maintain support programs for the elderly could as much as quintuple over the same
period. This represents uncharted water for demographic study and policymaking. Only since the
turn of the century have OECD nations begun nearing support rations of two. (OECD, 2017) If
the projections for Taiwan and similar lowest-low fertility regimes hold true, these nations will
be tasked with facing novel demographic impacts on their economies and societies.
Based on what has already been witnessed from cases around the world, high dependency
ratios, specifically with a large elderly dependency component, have been linked to a number of

economic consequences. It has been suggested that a greater burden of support for elderly
dependents—and thus higher pension and welfare costs—will result in a drain on national
savings, causing greater scarcity of investment and higher interest rates. (Santacreu, 2016) In
terms of individual consumption and investment, it has also been theorized that demographic
shifts of this nature may lead to greater consumption in high-demand services like healthcare,
while potentially reducing investment in real estate as a declining birth rate results in fewer and
fewer working-age adults in the market for housing. (Santacreu, 2016) Policymakers in Taiwan
are taking note of these possibilities.
Responding to these concerns about potential demographic-caused social issues, the
National Development Council has encouraged Taiwan’s policymakers to support pro-natal
measures. The Executive Yuan, the executive branch of Taiwan’s government, has approved a
set of measures for programs running from 2018 to 2022 that aim to meet a target fertility rate of
1.4 by 2030. (NDC, 2020) For Taiwan’s policymakers, a chief economic concern of falling
fertility rates has been the impact on labor supply. Taiwan has one of the world’s lowest labor
force participation rates and the government expects it to continue to fall. (NDC, 2015) Broadly
speaking, the policy menu prescribed by the Executive Yuan to respond to Taiwan’s
demographic transition has two fronts: increasing labor supply and increasing birth rates. In
pursuit of the former, the Executive Yuan has focused on attracting foreign skilled labor,
improving the work environment (especially for women), and speeding up the transition from
education to employment for young adults. (NDC, 2015)
For Taiwan, a key component of its demographic issues has been declining marriage
rates, strongly linked to the declining fertility rates. Marital rates have been plummeting in
Taiwan since the 1970s. Between 1970 and 2007, the percent of women under 30 who were
married plunged from 83% to just 31%, meaning nearly one in two women on average have gone
from marrying in their twenties to remaining single. (Lee, 2009) Interestingly, though not
surprisingly, while marital rates fell across both genders, survey results investigating the reasons
why young Taiwanese are remaining single turned up very different results. After not yet finding
the right person (a plurality for both genders), the next top reason was economic for men, while
women cited being content unmarried and fear of an unhappy marriage as their next two top
reasons. Economic concerns hardly factored into the women’s break down, while fear of an
unhappy marriage only registered with 1% of men. (Lee, 2009) Chinese culture undoubtedly has
a hand in these results—for example, tradition says the groom is expected to pay for the wedding
in China, and often the house as well. (CGTN, 2018; Fincher, 2016) On the other hand, the
distinction of a Taiwanese cultural identity may also contribute. For example, while the social
phenomenon of “leftover women,” unmarried women past the age of 27 who are labeled
undesirable by deep-rooted tradition, has been propagandized by mainland state media (Fincher,
2016), ROC President Tsai-Ing Wen is herself an unmarried woman. Taiwan seems to have
mirrored its developed East Asian contemporaries, South Korea and Japan, with women waiting
later to get married, rather than perpetuating the “leftover women” stereotype. (Brandt, Turner,
& Zou, 2018; Lee, 2009)
While lowest-low fertility countries are often lumped together in studies of demographic
transition, this question may motivate national differentiation when analyzing the drivers of
lowest-low fertility. Consider that much of western and northern Europe now see between 40%
and 60% of children born outside of marriage. (Haub, 2010; Lee, 2009) In Taiwan, that number
has yet to exceed just 5%. (Suzuki, 2009; Wu & Chiang, 2015) Likewise, even among lowest-

low fertility nations in Europe, homeownership regimes vary greatly with different buying
traditions, habits, and outcomes. (Mulder, 2010) Taiwan’s unusually high homeownership rate,
consistently nearing 90%, is far higher than most lowest-low fertility nations. It is important to
consider that while factors like marriage and housing undoubtedly play an important role in
family planning, the family formation regimes that create lowest-low fertility conditions in each
concerned nation have a different structure. This not only means that studying each lowest-low
fertility country individually is valuable, but also that effective policy prescriptions for each may
vary significantly as well, despite facing the same problem.
Marriage aside, a second (and interrelated) key component identified as a possible
contributor to low fertility rates for Taiwan are economic institutions. Housing has been cited by
academics and policymakers alike as a barrier in the lowest-low fertility discussion, both broadly
and for Taiwan specifically. (Azevedo, Módenes, & López-Colás, 2019; Lee, 2009; Mulder,
2006; UN, 2015) In recent years, Taiwan has experienced soaring urban housing costs and a
large share of young adults continuing to reside with their parents, which might contribute to
delayed fertility. (UN, 2015) Perhaps the most pressing component in the intergenerational
socioeconomic conundrum is the rising cost of living in Taiwan compared to stagnating wages.
Since the turn of the century, average wages have only increased in about one in every two years.
Contrasted with Taiwan’s rising housing costs, wage stagnation makes the ability for young
adults to become financially independent, let alone start a family, increasingly difficult. (UN,
2015) Co-residence between young adults and parents is a common phenomenon in Taiwan and
Mainland China, but continued co-residence has been linked to lacking the financial means to
move out for Taiwanese young adults in particular. (Chu, Xie, & Yu, 2011) Like all countries,
Taiwan’s marriage culture, housing market, labor market, and traditional background are a
unique combination with their own challenges in the family formation context.
In addition to having one of the world’s lowest fertility rates, Taiwan also has one of the
world’s highest homeownership rates. Now over 80%, Taiwan’s homeownership rate is not only
high but has also been on a steady incline over the past thirty years. Only a handful of countries
in the world have higher rates of homeownership, and most developed countries trail Taiwan by
at least fifteen percent. (Bourassa & Peng, 2011) This has been the result of decades of public
policy devised under the belief that every family should own their own home. The strong belief
in the importance of homeownership, pushed by the government, has led most Taiwanese
families to buy a home even during a skyrocketing real estate market in the 1990s that saw home
prices jump around 500%. (Bourassa & Peng, 2011) This produces a housing market in Taiwan
with few parallels globally. The perceived importance of homeownership in Taiwan might give
stronger motivation to concerns about housing in the family planning context.
Falling birth rates have been a major political concern in Taiwan since former ROC
President Ma Ying Jeou declared record low 2010 births as a national crisis and named a
Minister without Portfolio to address the issue. Prior to that, a 1992 revision to Taiwan’s national
Guideline for Population Policy, which documents the government’s goals for fertility, marked
an official transition to pro-natalist policy. In 2006 a follow-up revision stressed the importance
of providing childbearing assistance but was otherwise lukewarm about population growth and
mainly emphasized improving quality of life. (Lee, 2009) Some of these quality of life measures
did serve to support fertility though, such as an expansion of Taiwan’s childcare system,
maternity leave, and financial support for raising children. Ma’s Guomindang Party, now the
opposition party, has suggested creating a government ministry for supporting births. (Hsiao,

2021) Since 2021, Taiwan’s government has stepped up its aggressive policy response aimed at
achieving birth rate goals. Just in the past year, parental leave subsidies have been increased by
one-third, paid leave for prenatal healthcare has been expanded, and direct-payment stipends for
new parents have been increased. This year, the government plans to reduce preschool fees as
well. (Su, 2022)
Still, many within Taiwan have criticized the government for not doing enough. The
transition from the anti-natal policies of the 1960s and 1970s to the pro-natal turnaround in the
1990s was slow and did not bring about the necessary change in attitude to be effectual in a
culture that had embraced the idea of limited fertility being good for the family. In addition to
this, sociologist Lee Meilin (2009) has also written in detail about how feminist and
environmentalist political movements create incidental push-back on pro-natal policies.
Government efforts in recent years have still been spotty. Taiwan’s ruling party, the Democratic
Progressive Party, has not been as aggressive as its predecessor. When addressing demographic
issues, solutions like boosting immigration have been suggested to boost the working-age
population and efforts to get women into the work force have been prioritized for the same
reason. (NDC, 2020) The efforts of government policymakers have largely been focused on
primarily easing the future burden on workers of a burgeoning elderly population, and
secondarily boosting birth rates. Above all, championing a high quality of life has largely
trumped all other policy interests throughout Taiwan’s recent history of demographic politics.

PRIOR LITERATURE
Taiwan’s rapid decline in birth rates and its potential causes have been the subject of a
range of literature. Luoh (2007) provides a decomposition of the birth rate decrease in Taiwan
into its potential contributing factors. Lee (2009) does a similar exercise. Luoh highlights
declining or delayed marriage as a primary factor in the trend of declining fertility and then
decomposes the decrease into a change in marital rates and a change in fertility rates among
married women between 1965 and 2005. Luoh shows that the age-specific fertility rate among
younger married women has actually increased over time in some cases, but a decrease in
marriage rates offset this. Lee (2009) confirms a staggering decline in female marriage rates,
especially for women in their twenties (from 83% to 31% between 1970 and 2007). Lee further
investigates social trends among married and unmarried women in Taiwan and finds that women
are declining to pursue marriage due to disinterest, a desire to pursue careers, and gender
inequality within the institution of marriage. Lee suggests greater gender equity in and beyond
marriage and stronger support systems for raising families would be beneficial to encouraging
family formation.
The effect of homeownership on fertility has been studied at the macro level. A number
of studies have investigated the link between national or regional homeownership regimes and
fertility. (Azevedo, Módenes, & López-Colás, 2019; Lo, 2012; Mulder & Billari, 2010)
Approaches like these look at a set of national factors or trends among a group of nations and
attempt to draw insight into the drivers of fertility based on national housing patterns. For
example, Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2001; 2002) compare national economic statistics among
lowest-low fertility European Union nations and those with higher fertility rates. They discuss
the relationship between economic conditions and fertility and theorize several socioeconomic
structures that might incentivize fertility rate declines. Mulder & Billari (2010) categorize EU

nations into groups based on their housing statistics and mortgage practices and discuss
correlated trends with lowest-low fertility nations. However, less attention has been paid at the
microeconomic level to the interaction of housing and fertility for individuals. This is a critical
differentiation: Mulder (2006) suggests that this may resolve certain contradictions in the theory.
This paper contributes to a discussion of how housing and fertility are linked at the individual
level.
The question of how homeownership impacts fertility decisions at the family level is
subject to academic debate. On one hand, some scholars suggest that homeownership provides
an important sense of stability for starting a family and demonstrate empirically a positive
relationship between homeownership and fertility metrics. (Azevedo, Módenes, & López-Colás,
2019; Becker, 1981; Dettling & Kearney, 2014) On the other hand, some scholars suggest that
fertility and homeownership, both being high-cost investments in developed countries, may
“crowd out” one another and fertility may be delayed or reduced among families that buy a
house early. Mulder (2006) attempts to bridge the competing theories about homeownership and
fertility by dividing the effect into a micro and macro effect. Mulder hypothesizes that there is a
positive relationship between homeownership and fertility at the family level, whereas higher
levels of homeownership nationwide (coupled with difficult access to housing financing) induce
lower fertility rates due to low turnover in the housing market.
A few studies have looked at homeownership and fertility in Taiwan specifically. K.T. Lo
(2012) studies the interaction between homeownership and fertility in Taiwan at the regional
level. The findings of this study support the hypothesis of Mulder (2006) that the costs of
homeownership and reproduction crowd out one another. Lo implements a fixed effects model
for regional panel data. Chen (2013) studies the relationship between housing prices and fertility
in Taiwan. Similarly, Yin & Su (2021) use panel data to study the effect of a rise in real estate
prices on China’s fertility rate and find a negative effect. Aside from homeownership, other
researchers studying fertility in Taiwan have focused on its interaction with crime (Huang,
Chiang, & Pan, 2015), economic uncertainty (Pan & Yang, 2020), and preferences for a child of
a certain sex (Hu & Chiang, 2021). This paper aims to contribute to the literature by studying
homeownership’s effect on fertility using individual panel data. As exemplified by Chen (2013),
individual panel data is more frequently used to study the relationship between housing prices
and fertility. The data used in this paper have previously been used to study parent-child coresidence trends in Taiwan and parts of China. (Chu, Xie, & Yu, 2011) I will use it to expand on
other studies looking at Taiwan, such as Lo (2012), by addressing the similar question of
homeownership and fertility with more individual specificity.

DATA
The Panel Study of Family Dynamics is a project founded in 1998 to collect panel data
on a range of domestic topics for Taiwan and limited part of Mainland China. This project was
initiated by researchers at Academia Sinica, the national academy of the Republic of China,
which also funds the project. The PSFD surveys groups of main respondents with birth years
between 1935 and 1991. All main respondents were between 25 and 64 years of age at the time
of their first interview. The first sample of data was collected in 1999 and the project conducts
follow-up interviews with the same sample of main respondents in subsequent panel sets. Since
1999, four new cohorts of respondents have been added to the project. In addition to main

respondents between 25 and 64, the project also surveys children of main respondents between
16 and 25. Once a main respondent’s child reaches the age of 25, they are included in a third
category of surveyed individuals, adult children, who are treated as an additional, separate
sample of main respondents. Surveys are conducted regularly, once every one or two years.
There are over 6,000 unique respondents in Taiwan as of 2020.
Respondents are randomly sampled geographically based on locality. Only one
respondent is sampled per household for the initial survey; follow-up surveys add additional
waves of adult children as respondents, but these are filtered out for the purposes of this paper.
For the five cohorts of main respondents, a probability proportional to size (PPS) model was
used to get an initial sample. According to the PSFD,
The townships and districts of Taiwan are first stratified by their degree of
urbanization. In the first stage of sampling, townships and districts are randomly
drawn from each stratum. In the second stage, villages are randomly drawn from
each selected township or district. In the third stage, individuals who fit the birth
year criterion are randomly drawn from each selected village.
Sampling of the cohorts has varied over time; the first three waves of new respondents and the
second two waves used different studies to stratify townships and districts. Additionally, how the
project deals with non-response has varied across samples. When a non-response to a follow-up
survey is deemed temporary by the PSFD (e.g. not a death), the non-respondent will still be
contacted in subsequent years despite dropping out of the sample for a year. Each individual
respondent is assigned a number with digits that link them to their initial geographic region and
family. That number is consistent across all iterations of the survey. Until 2016, almost all
interviews were conducted face-to-face; since then, online methods have been used as well. For
the main survey, respondents answer questions on topics such as health, employment, spousal
information, family, housing, and other domestic topics. These questions are repeated in each
follow-up with minimal changes to the questionnaire over time. For child respondents (before
age 25), the survey focuses primarily on educational topics along with a more simplistic
overview of family topics.
Table 1 contains summary statistics broken down by cohort, which refers to the first year
a participant was surveyed. First year surveys were initiated five times for the main sample:
1999, 2000, 2003, 2009, and 2016. One puzzling aspect of the data is the range of ages contained
within and between each cohort. Table 1 shows the average birth year and age at first survey for
each cohort. While the last three cohorts seem fairly consistent with average birth years around
30, the first two cohorts, sampled only one year apart, have an average birth year that varies by
more than a decade and have average ages at first survey in their forties or fifties, meaning many
respondents are well beyond their childbearing years. Furthermore, the youngest respondent in
the 1999 cohort was 36 at the time of first response and the youngest in the 2000 cohort was
already 46 years old. The PSFD’s documentation does not clarify why the age ranges vary so
greatly or why the age statistics for the first two cohorts do not include young adults.
Cohorts 1999 and 2000 have other peculiarities. Table 1 shows key variables to the
question of fertility and demonstrates both cohorts have extremely high levels of marriage. An
interesting trend that persists for all cohorts is the consistent rise in college education over time
(albeit with a decrease in the 2000 cohort). The college education level jumps by around 20% for
each new cohort from 2003 to 2016, and the 2003 cohort has a college education rate that is

around 10% higher or more than its predecessors. This shows an incredible rise in educational
investments in Taiwan over generation and time. The final statistic included in table 1 is the
percentage of respondents who were still answering the survey at its end, in 2018.
In some econometric studies, age and year of birth can be used fairly interchangeably,
especially if the economic environment within which the study takes place does not change over
time and the birth year effect predominantly just captures variation in the age of individuals.
However, a theme I develop over the course of the empirical analysis is that the year of a
respondent’s birth contains more relevant information than just how old they are in the case of
this data. One example of the importance of considering birth year (or cohort) in addition to age
as a relevant variable to Taiwanese family planning is contained in table 2. Here, the data are
sorted into two broad cohort groups according to the age ranges and birth years. The “Older
Cohorts” group includes those cohorts first surveyed in 1999 and 2000. I group these two cohorts
together because their average age at first survey is over forty. The “Younger Cohorts” group, on
the other hand, includes the remaining three cohorts (2003, 2009, and 2016), which each have an
average age at first survey within four years of one another, right around thirty years old. Though
the cohort method of sorting is not the cleanest way of comparing generations of respondents
born in the past fifty years and those born in the earlier decades of the twentieth century, the
cohort tool provides for easy and straightforward sorting. Table 3 shows select variables broken
down by both age range and group so that statistics for the same age group can be compared
across time.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables
1999
999
49.2%

2000
1960
49.9%

Cohort
2003
1152
46.0%

2009
2182
49.8%

2016
1972
48.9%

Average Birth Year
Age at First Survey
(Mean)
Min
Max

1958
41

1946
54

1970
33

1980
29

1987
29

36
55

46
66

27
41

26
62

25
32

Percent Married (Start)1
Percent Married (End)1

92.0%
94.7%

97.4%
98.0%

66.1%
80.5%

36.7%
63.1%

27.4%
34.8%

Education Level1
College Education
Female College Edu.2

11.0%
8.6%

7.4%
5.0%

20.3%
16.0%

39.1%
38.4%

62.0%
63.9%

Complete Response

46.6%

41.3%

46.3%

63.4%

78.5%

Number of Participants
Percent Female

Perhaps most striking is the statistical difference for the variables presented in table 3
between the respondents in their thirties in the older cohorts and the same age range in younger

cohorts. Marital rates for Taiwanese young adults in their thirties are nearly thirty percent lower
among the younger group. And the marital rate is not a standalone—homeownership rates are a
mere half what they were for that same age group in the older cohorts. The average number of
children had likewise more than halved as well. The staggering gaps between individuals of the
same age group across time suggests a changing environment in Taiwan’s society for
establishing some of these building blocks of a family. In approaching a model, these summary
statistics press the importance of not simply controlling for either birth year or age, but rather
doing both.
A final note on the data relates to the civil rights of LGBTQ+ individuals in Taiwan.
While Taiwan is well known for providing the greatest protection of LGBTQ+ rights in East
Asia, many of the reforms that established these rights have come since the most recent data
release from the PSFD. Gay marriage was legalized in 2019 and the provision for homosexual
couples to adopt is still undergoing legal and legislative approval as of 2022, so even for the
most recent survey conducted in 2018, it can still be assumed that all marriages are heterosexual
and any adoptions take place within heterosexual marriages.

Table 2: Group Statistics
Variables
20-29

30-39

Age Ranges
40-49

Marriage Status
Older Cohorts
Younger Cohorts

24.6%

90.8%
61.5%

94.8%
86.4%

96.6%
90.4%

98.1%
-

Homeownership
Older Cohorts
Younger Cohorts

8.6%

59.1%
27.0%

71.4%
51.9%

78.3%
64.5%

84.4%
-

Children
Older Cohorts
Younger Cohorts

0.28

2.03
0.90

2.34
1.67

2.72
1.87

3.33
-

50-59

60+

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
General Regression: Number of Children
To evaluate the relationship between fertility and homeownership, I regress
homeownership status against the total number of children a respondent has using an OLS
model. The following model represents such a regression.
[A] Ω𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1𝑖 + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
Here, omega (Ωi) represents the total number of children for individual i, 𝛽0 is an intercept value,
𝛽1 represents the increase in the number of children someone is expected to have had if they own

their home, 𝑥1𝑖 is a dummy variable for homeownership status where a value of 0 means
individual i does not own their home and a values of 1 means they do, 𝛽𝑘 is the coefficient for
each of k control variables, 𝑥𝑘𝑖 is the individual’s value for control variable k, and εi is an
idiosyncratic error term for individual i.
Table 3 contains the estimation of model (A) for the full dataset with different selections
of control variables. The first variation, regression (1.1), is an initial estimation with no control
variables. It just looks at the correlation between whether an individual is a homeowner and the
number of children the individual has. Regression (1.2) adds control variables for whether an
individual has ever been married, their age, and their birth year. Regression (1.3) also includes
controls for the combined household wages of the respondent and whether they graduated from a
post-secondary school.
Age is an obvious variable to control for in this and subsequent regressions. Since human
fertility is naturally dependent on age perhaps more so than any other variable, controlling for
age is necessary. Furthermore, older individuals are more likely to own homes and have older
children, so controlling for age is an important step in clarifying the effect of homeownership.
Age is likely to interact with family planning decisions in different ways at different points in
life, so a simple age control may not be sufficient to accurately capture age effects. For example,
the impact of age on expectations for total number of children would presumably be quite
significant when looking at respondents between ages 25 and 45. However, expectations for total
number of children would probably not vary much by age for respondents between the ages of 65
and 85. Because the anticipated impact of another year of life on fertility outcomes is not
uniform throughout one’s life, including an age-squared variable in addition to the age variable
allows for more nuance when modeling age’s effect.
In addition to age, a variable for birth year is included. This variable is important and
distinct from the age variable because it represents a generational effect, while the age variable
represents a point in the respondent’s lifecycle. The generational effect turns out to be quite
significant, with a strong negative effect on the expectation for number of children. After its
inclusion alongside other controls, homeownership loses its significance. When searching for
reasons why different regressions for different generations may affect homeownership’s
significance, one explanation could be motivated by the age differentiation. Since respondents in
the older cohorts, for the most part, are not actively having more children and other aspects of
their life are likely to be less dynamic, the survey could be seen more of as a reflection of their
past. The interpretation of this coefficient would be that those who own a home are expected to
have had more children. But it may be that young people start having children and purchasing
real estate irrespective of one another, so while later in life having done both is a strong
correlation, the relationship at a young age is less defined. However, there are other possibilities.
There may be a generational difference; the story in Taiwan may not be consistent across time.
Perhaps homeownership was a major factor in fertility decisions for older generations, but
younger generations are acting differently. Given the evolution of fertility trends in Taiwan in
the past eighty years, this seems plausible.

Regardless, I include birth year as a control variable in regressions (1.2) and (1.3) for its
usefulness in differentiating between generations and I believe this is preferable to dividing the
sample by groups or cohorts. Although their averages are very different, the cohorts themselves
do contain a range of ages and birth years. While manually dividing the sample by generation
might solve this issue, it is difficult to know where exactly to draw lines between generations. As
for the two groups of cohorts I’ve previously outlined, the groups are a simplification rather than
a clarification of the data, meaning they lump together cohorts which have average birth years
that vary by as much as twenty years. The two groups better capture differences in average ages,
but since new samples are added decades apart, this doesn’t necessarily translate best to
generational differences. As a result, I find the birth year approach to be more convincing.
Table 3: Regressions, Number of Children (Model A) (Full Dataset)
Children
(1.1)
(1.2)
(1.3)
n
55172
54647
49972
Homeowner
1.338***
-.010
.006
.012

Ever Married

1

Age
Age-Squared
Birth Year

2

Household Wages

.010

.010

1.497***

1.482***

.013

.013

-.018***

-.021***

.003

.003

.000***

.000***

.000

.000

-.044***

-.041***

.001

.001

3

-.001***
.000

College

4

-0.303***
.012

β0

R-Squared
f-statistic

1.272***

2.239***

2.376***

.009

.099

.101

.1890
12859

.6087
16993

.6251
11902

* Statistically significant at 90%
** Significant at 95%
*** Significant at 99%
1
Ever married, including cohabitation, those separated or divorced, and those with deceased
spouses
2
Starting at 1934 (this variable is birth year minus 1934)
3
New Taiwan Dollar, tens of thousands, combined wages of respondent and spouse
4
College has a value of 1 if respondent has ever graduated from a tertiary education program and
zero if not

In demographic studies, women’s education has long been the hallmark barometer and
most powerful influence on a nation’s fertility rate. (Kasarda, 1979; Martin, 1995; Martin &
Juarez, 1995) The theoretical explanation has several components: first, women with more

education are more likely to be able to be informed about and exercise reproductive health care.
Women’s education is a factor within the umbrella of women’s rights, and the promotion of
women’s rights empowers women to assume greater autonomy over their reproductive decisionmaking. In addition, it is widely held that women’s education goes hand-in-hand with economic
development, which in turn is linked to declining fertility rates at the macroeconomic level.
(King & Hill, 1997)
While a variable for women’s education would have been preferable to an all-gendered
education variable from a theoretical standpoint, the only implementation to do so without losing
the half of the sample that are men would be to use the spousal education variable for men as a
reflection of their wife’s education. This could work well, except that it would effectively restrict
the sample to women and only married men (unmarried men would be dropped). Because
unmarried men can have children too, and because for the purposes of this model I want to
include marriage as a control variable rather than limiting the sample to just married couples, I
opt for simply using the respondent’s education background (specifically, whether they
graduated from a tertiary education program) in place of women’s education. While a female
education variable may be more interesting, an all-gendered education variable is still quite
theoretically useful as it at least partially reflects the education background of the household.
Finally, the sum of household wages is included as an independent variable. The impact
of income on fertility is contested in the literature (Bar, Hazan, Leukhina, Weiss, & Zoabi, 2018;
Borg, 1989) and presents an interesting, but motivating, inclusion in the model. Theoretical
understandings of fertility debate whether household income provides greater means for parents
to raise a larger family or whether those with a higher income are more likely to make high-cost
investments in their children (such as education) that result in having fewer children. While this
paper doesn’t attempt to address this question, a family’s income is undoubtedly a major
consideration in their family planning, so it warrants inclusion regardless of which theory is
correct. Unfortunately, the PSFD did not collect household data consistently for all income
sources (e.g. investments, transfers, etc.) so I choose to go with the consistent data for a
summation of respondent and spousal wages. While this data will not perfectly reflect total
income (for instance, a wealthy investor may not earn wages), it at least incorporates some
representation of the household’s socioeconomic status.
In table 4, regression (1.1) shows a strong positive correlation between whether an
individual is a homeowner and the number of children they have. When the controls for
marriage, age, and birth year are added in with regression (1.2), however, homeownership loses
its statistical significance, and the magnitude of the coefficient falls from more than one to
negative one one-hundredth. The explanation seems straightforward: all else equal, older
individuals are more likely to be homeowners than younger individuals, so homeownership may
be acting as a proxy for age in the initial regression. Homeownership may also be acting as a
proxy for marriage if individuals in established families are more likely to be homeowners than
single people, which seems logical. The most statistically significant and largest magnitude
variable is marriage: a married individual is expected to have one to two more children on
average than an unmarried individual. Age is also statistically significant. Its linear value has a

negative coefficient and its squared value has a positive coefficient. Taken together, age alone—
that is to say, not in conjunction with another factor, such as getting married—does not start
having a clear positive effect on the number of children an individual is expected to have until
around forty years old.
In regression (1.3), the coefficients for the variables defined in (1.2) are roughly the
same. Household wages and college education are both shown to have a significant negative
effect on fertility. While the negative effect of college on fertility is well-established
theoretically, the negative effect of wages is an interesting, if not unpredictable, result. A few
notes on the wage effect: this variable represents the combined wages of the individual and their
spouse, if they have one. It seems reasonable to expect households with two working parents
may have higher combined wages than those with one, and households with two working parents
should also be expected to have fewer children. Women’s employment has been tied in the
literature to lower fertility rates. (Berhardt, 1993) Much of the theoretical component of this
paper deals with the hypothesis that homeownership and childbearing may be decisions that
crowd each other out due to their high costs on a couple. At first glance, it seems like higher
wages would alleviate that concern and enable more childbearing, but given more careful
consideration, including the factors discussed previously that complicate the income effect, the
negative relationship becomes more understandable.
As an initial analysis of homeownership’s impact on Taiwanese family planning, this
model suggests that homeownership only predicts fertility insofar as it reflects someone’s marital
status and age. It is important to note that this regression is very limited in how it can be
interpreted. Because the regression is not taking into account a timeline for when these events
happen, and because respondents for a range of ages are mixed together, important and more
complex interpretations are not yet possible. For example, two sixty-year-olds may both have
children and own their home, but they might have very different stories relating to this statistic.
We can imagine one may have had their first child when they were twenty-five and bought their
first home when they were forty-five while the other bought their first home at thirty and had
their first child at thirty-two. Despite their significant differences in homeownership and fertility
history, our imagined pair of respondents are represented identically as observations in this
regression. As a result, this regression can only be interpreted as a simple correlation between
whether a person owns a home and whether they have children. There are a few ways to address
some of these concerns. The next regression, a female-specific regression, restricts the sample to
a limited and perhaps more insightful subsample.

Female-Specific Regression
Model (A) can be expanded on for sample subsets. One population that is definitely of
particular interest when studying fertility topics is women of childbearing age, and there are a
few benefits for a regression using this subset that were not achievable with the main sample.
First, there are female-specific variables that family planning and fertility literature pay
particular interest to and which I would be remiss not to build a model using. Second, a version

of model (A) with just females of childbearing age is a straightforward way to ensure that the
results of regressions (1.1) through (1.3) still hold when just focusing on the most important
demographic to reproductive trends. Not only does a female-specific regression allow for the
inclusion of other relevant variables, but it also provides a more specific window to study the
same question.
Table 4 contains four regressions that follow the general structure of model (A) but
incorporate new controls and limit the sample to women in their 20s and 30s. The minimum age
in the data is 25, so this allows for a fifteen-year age range in the subsample, from 25 to 39. The
control variables used in this model are the same controls for whether a respondent has ever been
married, their age and birth year, college education, and a new control for whether they are
employed.
Table 4: Regressions, Children (Model A) (Female, 20-39)
(2.1)
(2.2)
(2.3)
Child
n
9079
9077
9077
Homeowner
.658***
-.003
-.050***
.024

Ever Married
Age
Age-Squared

(2.4)
8690
-.028

.019

.019

.019

1.431***

1.409***

1.306***

.018

.018

.018

-.301***

-.290***

-.254***

.037

.036

.036

.005***

.005***

.004***

.001

.001

.001

-.025***

-.023***

.002

.002

Birth Year
Employed

-.193***
.019

College

-.274***
.017

β0

R-Squared
f-statistic

.806***

4.148***

5.559***

5.241***

.013

.599

.598

.598

.0751
737

.5237
2494

.5359
2095

.5521
1529

* Statistically significant at 90%
** Significant at 95%
*** Significant at 99%
1
Ever married, including cohabitation, those separated or divorced, and those with deceased spouses
2
New Taiwan Dollar, tens of thousands, combined wages of respondent and spouse
3
College has a value of 1 if respondent has ever graduated from a tertiary education program

Women’s education is widely regarded as the critical indicator for birth rate declines:
education gives an individual the knowledge base for informed family planning, financial
independence, and broader career opportunities. (Martin & Juarez, 1995) Women’s education is
also often strongly correlated with national development indicators like higher wages, capital

development, and low infant mortality rates, which create an environment where having many
children becomes less important. (Martin, 1995) Women’s education is also closely linked to
women’s rights. (King & Hill, 1997) For these reasons, women’s education is often identified by
demographers as a crucial step towards demographic transition. I include the same college
variable in regression (2.4) as that in (1.3); while women’s college education and non-gendered
college education are surely closely interrelated, having a women’s education control is quite
useful theoretically.
Female employment is a commonly studied factor in fertility trends. There is strong
theoretical reasoning for this, especially studying the effect of motherhood on employment, since
giving birth to and raising a child will obviously be a large time commitment competing with a
mother’s time allocation to possible employment. (The literature also notes that this impact
declines the older a mother’s children get, again for fairly obvious reasons, as older children
require less constant attention.) (Bernhardt, 1993) However, the empirical impact of employment
on fertility is much less clear. In developed countries, previous studies suggest that a negative
correlation between female employment and fertility existed prior to the 1980s, but that the trend
disappeared and even flipped to a positive correlation in the more recent decades. (Oshio, 2019;
Engelhardt, 2004) In particular, the closer to present, the stronger the positive correlation
between a nation’s female employment rate and TFR. (Oshio, 2019) However, this question has
mostly been looked at using national trend data and has not had extensive research within a panel
data structure.
Despite the mixed bag of results for developed countries’ employment effects on fertility,
theoretical explanations are easy to come by for the link between the two. Conventional wisdom
had been that female employment decreases the likelihood of reproduction due to the time
commitment of employment. (Becker, 1981) However, the change in pattern for developed
countries spurred alternative theories. Oshio (2019) suggests that a higher socioeconomic
background leads to better environmental conditions for raising children in developed countries.
In particular, for higher-income parts of the world, a two-income household may yield such
important economic benefits that it offsets the difficulties stemming from the added time
constraint. However, the result for this variable in regression (2.4) is still negative and
statistically significant, more closely aligning to the traditional view of employment and fertility.
The regressions presented in table 4 largely reflect the same trends seen in regressions
(1.1) through (1.3). The female-only regressions are not totally analogous to their full-sample
predecessors, though. One additional regression is included to provide additional insight to the
one area where the female regressions diverge significantly from their full-sample counterparts.
Aside from homeownership’s coefficient in model (2.3), the rest of the regression outcomes
resemble the estimations of the first set of regressions fairly well. When employment status and
college education are added in to complete the set of controls, homeownership once again loses
its explanatory value. Employment and college predictably have a negative effect on number of
children.
Regressions (2.2) and (2.3) are very similar; regression (2.3) adds only a control for birth
year. Curiously, when age alone is introduced to the model, homeownership loses its

significance, but when birth year is then also added, its coefficient gains a significant negative
effect. One theoretical interpretation for this could be that homeownership captures two distinct
and separate effects: a generational divide and a class divide. In both cases, older and upper-class
individuals may both be expected to have larger-than-average wealth endowments—and thus are
more likely to own their home. This creates two groups of likely homeowners, the older
generation and the younger upper-class, who have conflicting fertility outlooks. As evidenced by
regression (1.3), the earlier a person’s birth year, the more children they are expected to have, but
the more money a person makes, the fewer children they are expected to have. This could mean
that older generation homeowners are expected to have more children while younger affluent
homeowners are expected to have fewer children, jumbling the effect of homeownership after
controlling for marriage and age and leaving homeownership’s coefficient ambiguous in
regression (2.2). However, when just one of those effects, birth year, is controlled for in
regression (2.3), homeownership not only regains its significance, but flips negative. Finally,
when the college variable is introduced in (2.4), both effects are accounted for in the control
terms and homeownership again loses its statistical significance.
An obvious problem with this interpretation is that regression (1.2) did not have a
significant negative coefficient for homeownership despite controlling for birth year. A possible
explanation to resolve this point of contention could be that the class effect is only relevant to
homeownership for women; the observed negative effects for socioeconomic factors are only
reflected in the homeownership variable for women while men’s homeownership is more
consistent across class. However, these models are not enough to substantiate the possible
answers I lay out to address the discrepancy. Further investigation on this topic could be
promising.

Child Difference Regression
In further developing a model of the effect of homeownership on fertility, I exploit the
panel structure of the data to build a regression model with a differenced dependent variable.
Here, the dependent variable is the change in the number of children a respondent has between
year t and one year prior. The homeownership status in year t is the independent variable. A few
key points are worth noting about this model: first, these numbers represent total children, not
just dependents. Second, while the number of children an individual has is not likely to increase
by more than one per year, the dependent variable is not a binary variable and it is possible for
the increase to be two or more.
Finally, the loss of children is factored out because it does not indicate a family planning
decision—all negative values are changed to zero. It is not clear why year-over-year changes in
survey data might show the loss of a child. This could be due to the death of a child or a
reporting error. Perhaps factors like estrangement or divorce might prompt a respondent to report
fewer children. Nonetheless, all negative values are removed. (The loss of children could
theoretically be problematic if a respondent loses a child and gains a child in a year, but that
seems rare enough as to not affect the model outcome.) Model (B) specifies this regression.

[B] Ω𝑖𝑡 − Ω𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
The dependent variable term Ω represents the same value as it has in preceding models,
this time subtracting out the previous year’s number of children to derive a change value. The
intercept value 𝛽0 represents the expected change in number of children for an individual with all
𝑥𝑖 = 0; this is a hard value to interpret because age is included as a control variable. For the
independent variable’s coefficient interpretation, β1 is the additional expected change in number
of children associated with someone owning their own home. A binary independent variable for
homeownership is 𝑥1𝑖𝑡 and control variables k are included in a summation containing some
controls that were included in previous models and some new ones. Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents
idiosyncratic error.
As in previous models, age, birth year, marital status, and household wages are controlled
for. The incorporation of these variables as controls is the same, with the exception of marital
status. The ever married variable is replaced with a current marital status variable, which has a
value of one if the respondent is married or cohabiting and a value of zero if not. New variables
included in this model are controls for dragon and tiger zodiac years. Some papers studying
fertility in the Chinese diaspora control for the year of the dragon and tiger. (Lo, 2012) In
Sinophone countries where the Chinese zodiac is observed, children born in the year of the
dragon are ascribed particularly desirable traits, while tradition holds a superstition against births
in the year of the tiger. National statistics demonstrate a spike in births during dragon years and
the inverse in tiger years. Studies have demonstrated a causal effect, (Goodkind, 1993; Yip, Lee,
& Chung, 2002) though the continued significance of this effect has been questioned. (Hung,
2016) Over the course of this survey’s time period, one dragon year (2012) and one tiger year
(2010) are represented in the data. I include a dummy variable for both in two of the regressions
for this model.
Table 5 contains the results of this model estimation under three sets of controls.
Regression (3.1) contains just the homeownership variable and controls for marital status and
age, the variables with the strongest theoretical justification and results in previous models. Here,
homeownership has a statistically significant positive effect on the expectation for change in
children. However, the inclusion of variables for birth year and zodiac controls in regression
(3.2) eliminates the explanatory value of homeownership. Regression (3.3) adds household
wages as a regressor.
Previous models showed how the introduction of age and marriage variables consistently
eliminate the significance of the homeownership effect in the aggregate and the results from the
differences model also illustrate the importance of generational variation in clarifying this effect
generally across models. While the dragon year and tiger year controls were also introduced in
model (5.2), these variables only carry non-zero values in two out of sixteen survey years. Birth
year seems the by far more likely culprit that resulted in homeownership losing its significance.
Since age is already controlled for, the inclusion of birth year is not showing the effect of how
old someone is, but rather the effect of when someone was born, or what generation they belong
to. This variable allows us to differentiate between our fertility expectations for a thirty-year-old
in 2000 and a thirty-year-old in 2015. The strong negative coefficient for birth year shows that

all else equal, we can expect those who have reached reproductive age more recently to have
fewer new children at any given age level. Not only is this consistent with the previous models’
results, but it is also quite predictable given what we already know about Taiwan’s falling TFR.
Table 5: Regressions, New Child (Full Dataset)
New Child
(3.1)
(3.2)
n
54650
54650
Homeowner
.040***
.003
Currently Married

1

Age
Age-Squared
Birth Year

.004

.004

.004

.057***

.045***

.052***

.004

.004

.004

-.055***

-.094***

-.094***

.001

.001

.001

.000***

.001***

.001***

.000

.000

.000

-.018***

-.018***

.000

.000

2

Household Wages

(3.3)
49966
.003

3

-.000***
.000

Dragon Year

.138***

.118***

.005

.005

-.186***

-.199***

.006

.006

1.628***

3.477***

3.505***

.021

.035

.037

.1459
2333

.2350
2398

.2361
1930

Tiger Year
β0

R-Squared
f-statistic

* Statistically significant at 90%
** Significant at 95%
*** Significant at 99%
1
Currently married, including cohabitation
2
Years since 1934, the oldest observed birth year
3
New Taiwan Dollar, tens of thousands, combined wages of respondent and spouse,
monthly

But what does the loss of statistical significance for homeownership mean in conjunction
with this? The relationship between generation and homeownership seems complex: in the
female-specific model, the introduction of birth year gave homeownership an entirely new
direction of correlation. For the differences model, homeownership also has a significant effect
even with marriage status and age included, but loses significance once birth year and wages are
included. Since homeownership only loses its statistical significance once birth year is
introduced, like before, the significant coefficient for homeownership in regression (3.1) may be
masking an intergenerational story. One similarity across models is that including birth year as a
control always results in a lack of a significant positive correlation between homeownership and
fertility outcomes. This lends itself to the implication that any positive relationship between

homeownership and fertility is merely due to older generations being more likely to both own a
home and have more children.
Regression (3.2) does provide a new level of clarification. Model (A)’s dependent
variable was the total number of children a respondent had had over the course of their lifetime,
which presented some ambiguity with the theoretical interpretation, especially for the older
individuals included in the full sample who were unlikely to have new children. These regression
results show a dynamic relationship. When all controls are included, homeownership not only
lacks a correlation with the number of total children a respondent has, but also lacks a correlation
with the expectation for whether the respondent will have a new child in the next year.

First Differences Regression
A first differences regression can be used to estimate the change in number of children as
a function of the change in homeownership while eliminating the possible influence of individual
attributes that do not change over time. This nicely allows for a more direct method of estimating
the relationship between homeownership and fertility without concerns about a myriad of static
variables. The model’s dependent variable is the change in number of children for year t. Like
the previous model that uses change in number of children as its dependent variable, this is not a
binary variable, but its values will typically be zero or one. The intercept 𝛽0 is the expected
change in number of children provided no independent variables change between year t–1 and t.
The independent variable (𝑥1𝑡𝑖 − 𝑥1𝑡−1𝑖 ) represents the change in homeownership as the
difference between the same binary variable over the course of two time periods. Since a value
of one is assigned to 𝑥1𝑡𝑖 when the individual owns their home and a value of zero when they
don’t, the independent variable for homeownership change in this model will have a value of one
if the individual has become a homeowner over the past year, a value of zero if their
homeownership status hasn’t changed, and a value of negative one if they were previously a
homeowner but now are not. The model is specified below.
[C] (Ω𝑖𝑡 − Ω𝑖𝑡−1 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑥1𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥1𝑖𝑡−1 ) + ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛽𝑘 (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
The model controls for k control variables that do vary over time. The use of these
variables follows the same approach: each variable’s value in year t is subtracted from the
previous period’s value. Previously used controls like birth year are not used in the model since
they do not vary over time. Although college may vary over time, most of the variation will
occur prior to childbearing, so I opt not to include it in this regression. Age, on the other hand,
does vary over time, but it does so in standard increments, so it is omitted as well. The variables
that are included in the control summation are the respondent’s current marital status, their
combined household wages, and whether year t is a dragon or tiger year.
Because this model uses change in number of children as its dependent variable, I choose
to restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 20 and 39, when having children is most
likely. This eliminates any concerns about a large volume of observations with zeroes for the
dependent variable (but non-zero values for the independent and control variables) from

cluttering the model and keeps the intuition of the coefficient values straightforward. Doing so
certainly eliminates individuals who may have children at a later age—particularly men, whose
window for childbearing years is greater than that for women—however, this regression provides
the most value for the purposes of studying how homeownership influences family formation,
particularly with an interest in addressing low fertility rates and public policy.
Table 6: First Differences Regression (C) (Ages 20-39)
Child
(4)
n
38698
∆ Homeowner
.070***
.012

∆ Current Marital Status

1

.119***
.007

∆ Household Wages2

.000
.000

Dragon Year

-.004
.005

Tiger Year

-.006
.006

β0

.035***
.002

R-Squared
f-statistic

.0083
65

* Statistically significant at 90%
** Significant at 95%
*** Significant at 99%
1
Currently married, including cohabitation
2
New Taiwan Dollar, tens of thousands, combined wages of respondent and spouse

Table 6 presents the results of the first differences model. Here, a change in
homeownership and marital status are both associated with a same-year increase in number of
children. These results have a strong statistical significance. All other independent variables were
not found to have a significant association with a change in number of children. While previous
models estimated in this paper have found that homeownership loses its explanatory value with
respect to childbearing when sufficient controls are introduced, this regression result suggests
that becoming a homeowner does have predictive value over whether the respondent will also
have a child. It is important to note here that the causality is not clear: this regression is not
suggesting that becoming a homeowner leads to having one or more new children; it is merely
suggesting that the two are correlated. The causation may go in the other direction, with an
anticipated new birth leading to a couple choosing to buy a home.
This result can be reconciled with a lack of significance for the homeownership variable
in previous models in that the first differences regression provides insight into a sort of timeline
of events. While homeownership may not be associated with an increase in the overall number of
children we would expect a family to have, homeownership may be associated with an increase

in the number of children we would expect the family to have in the next year (or next few
years). We could extrapolate and imagine that homeownership may be linked with the timing of
when families start having children, and younger homeownership could potentially be associated
with having more children, even if homeownership alone is not. This provides a useful starting
point for further research.
One helpful way to conceptualize this model compared to the child differences model is
imagining a population of people divided into two groups: homeowners and non-homeowners. In
the child differences approach, model (B), the expectation for whether someone has a new child
in the next year is the same, all else equal. In the first differences approach, model (C), we divide
the population in a new way: whether someone has bought a house in the past year and whether
they haven’t. In this model, the expectation for whether someone has a new child is different.
Those who bought a new home are more likely to have a new child than those who did not. What
we can draw from this conceptualization is that homeownership may not be a very good
predictor for whether someone has a child, but the timing of becoming a homeowner is a good
predictor of when someone has a child.

CONCLUSION
Taiwan is at the global forefront of lowest-low fertility research and policy formation. Its
demographic story is critical to the livelihood its future generations will face on the island and
will inform population researchers’ understanding of low fertility for decades to come. The
familial, social, and cultural structures give Taiwan unique characteristics, but the questions it
faces today are shared by many countries around the world. As more nations advance through
economic development, demographic change is sure to follow, and the question of what factors
influence fertility and in what way will only become more relevant. This paper has studied at one
variable of interest, homeownership, and explored ways it interacts with fertility at the individual
level.
This paper’s results call into question whether homeownership alone plays an impactful
role in family planning decisions. Regressions (1.1) through (1.3) initially show that
homeownership is only empirically tied to fertility in the absence of stronger variables. Though
homeownership has a positive correlation with the number of children a person has, once marital
status and age are accounted for, homeownership loses its explanatory value. Age and marital
status are both strongly correlated with homeownership, so it is easy to see how homeownership
may have only been serving as a proxy for those more impactful fertility indicators.
The female-specific OLS regressions support most of the findings of the general OLS
regressions. Once again, homeownership has a sizeable effect as a lone independent variable, but
once all the controls are introduced, it completely loses its statistical significance. One difference
worth highlighting between the female-specific regressions and the full-sample regressions is
that when just controls for age, marriage, and birth year were introduced, homeownership lost its
significant effect for the general sample but saw the coefficient sign switch from positive to
negative for the female sample. A possible explanation is that the homeownership variable

contains information about important education and workforce factors in the sample of women,
but do not do so in the mixed sample. This topic warrants further study. However, it seems
unlikely that homeownership itself was truly the root factor at play.
The child differences regression model again indicates that the correlation between
homeownership and fertility is a proxy for other factors impacting family formation patterns.
Though homeownership retains a positive effect on whether a respondent will have a child in the
next year with only controls for marriage and age included, the addition of generational and
socioeconomic controls results in the effect of homeownership disappearing. This supports the
idea discussed in response to the female-specific regressions that generation and class may also
have effects that homeownership is capturing in addition to marital status and age. Uniformly,
whether a model uses a cumulative fertility dependent variable or a change in fertility dependent
variable, once controls for marriage, age, generation, and socioeconomic background are
included, homeownership alone is not correlated with fertility.
However, the first differences model suggests that a change in homeownership is
correlated with family planning decisions. The first differences model shows that in a dynamic
setting, someone who becomes a homeowner in a given year is more likely to also have a child
in that year than the rest of the population. This is a likely but nonetheless interesting outcome:
obtaining a home and having children are both logical building blocks to family formation and it
is easy to see how they go hand-in-hand. However, previous literature has called into question
whether these two life events would really be expected to go together or whether their costs
would crowd one another out. Confirming that homeownership increases the likelihood of a
young adult having a child in the next year is useful to a broader discussion about the
interconnectedness of housing, marriage, and childbearing in family planning.
Throughout the empirical analysis, homeownership often took the backseat to stronger
variables as a predictor of fertility. It is tempting to say that for Taiwan, the focus should be on
marriage culture rather than the housing market when it comes to pro-natal interests. However,
the close ties between these variables related to family formation—a close relationship that is
easy to define empirically, theoretically, and anecdotally—does not allow for an easy resolution.
Perhaps marital status absorbs most of the predictive power over fertility outcomes and leaves
little explanatory value for homeownership. But let’s take a step back: what if homeownership is,
in turn, the primary predictor of whether a young couple gets married? What if buying a home is
the main barrier to getting married in Taiwan? Although marriage may be the more direct factor
influencing fertility, homeownership may still be just as important of a factor in the family
formation story.
Untangling this knot of interrelated and highly correlated issues may be difficult to do
empirically, but further research into how Taiwan’s current housing market is affecting the
ability of couples who would like to get married to do so would be a good first step. Further
research that focuses on how the timing of life events, such as marriage, buying a first home, and
having a first child affect one another would provide important insight not only into how these
variables are related but also what factors are most important to enabling family formation.
Additional research that could address the causality of effects on homeownership would also be

useful in clarifying what socioeconomic factors have a true effect. Formulating targeted policy is
difficult to do in the absence of this information.
At a fundamental level, the question of how governments can best respond to declining
fertility is complicated by the question of whether and to what extent these trends are a problem.
One conceptual approach to consider is a decomposition of declining fertility. Meilin Lee (2009)
has previously attempted to break down Taiwan’s fertility decline into its contributing
components. Most significantly, a decomposition of the decrease into the effects of
socioeconomic factors and personal preference factors is very significant not only for
formulating an effective policy response, but also for evaluating the scale and short-run
significance of the conceived problem. If the bulk of the reason young people are not having
children is due to institutional economic barriers, this presents a complex but clearly motivating
direction for government action. These economic barriers to family formation would, in this
case, be clearly limiting to the utility of young adults and warrant a strong economic agenda. On
the other hand, if the primary reason young people are not having children is simply because of
their personal preferences, the response is much more complicated. It would be controversial for
a government to try to influence social preferences, the direction for policy formation is less
clear, and trying to effectively encourage a desire for fertility seems a dubious task. Moreover, a
government trying to encourage a change in preferences seems contrary to the utility interests of
its people. Even as we consider the economic drivers of delayed family formation, the role of
changing attitudes towards childbearing is important to keep in mind and warrants more study.
Comparing the effects of sociological preferences and economic conditions as they relate to low
fertility would be particularly useful in a joined literature.
One challenge for policymakers in Taiwan is weighing competing interests and desirable
economic outcomes, even within the demographic issues discussed in this paper. For instance,
one of the chief concerns of the falling fertility rate is the burden on shrinking future generations
of working-class people to support a ballooning elderly population. Although Taiwan’s recordlow fertility rate may be the root cause, one of the chief policy pursuits of Taiwan’s government
goes in a different direction: getting women to enter the workforce and stay in the workforce.
This, of course, is a noble goal and more women in the workforce will help alleviate the
impending labor market shortage that the Taiwanese government seems particularly concerned
with. However, it will also undoubtedly contribute to Taiwan’s TFR decline—an established
fertility effect that was supported by this paper’s regression results. This is one example of how
social policy can be a double-edged sword for competing interests. It is important for
policymakers to define a clear vision for a long-term economic future and come up with holistic
solutions rather than addressing different social concerns independent of one another.
The contributing and limiting factors to family planning form a complex relationship that
take a different shape in different societies around the world. With one of the world’s lowest
fertility rates and highest homeownership rates, Taiwan’s demographics and housing market both
represent intriguing case studies. Taken together, investigating the role homeownership plays in
family planning represents an important question for the island and for demographers globally.
In Taiwan, marriage and socioeconomic background appear to be stronger indicators of fertility

outcomes than homeownership. Generational effects also show a strong influence over both
fertility and homeownership’s effect on fertility. Policymakers in Taiwan will likely need to take
a broad view and consider many of these social and economic structures in tandem; addressing
housing without addressing social attitudes towards marriage and children, for instance, seems
unlikely to yield strong pro-natal results. This paper contributes a next step for research into
housing and fertility in Taiwan, but further exploration into the relationship between the two,
especially in pursuit of developing a multivariate model of family formation, would be extremely
valuable to fertility research and policy.
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